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Efficient multiparty quantum secret sharing of secure direct communication
Jian Wang,∗ Quan Zhang, and Chao-jing Tang
School of Electronic Science and Engineering,
National University of Defense Technology,
Changsha, 410073, China
In this paper, we present an (n, n) threshold quantum secret sharing scheme of secure direct
communication using Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state. The present scheme is efficient in that
all the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states used in the quantum secret sharing scheme are used to
generate shared secret messages except those chosen for checking eavesdropper. In our scheme, the
measuring basis of communication parties is invariable and the classical information used to check
eavesdropping needs only the results of measurements of the communication parties. Another nice
feature of our scheme is that the sender transmit her secret messages to the receivers directly and
the receivers recover the sender’s secret by combining their results, different from the QSS scheme
whose object is essentially to allow a sender to establish a shared key with the receivers. This feature
of our scheme is similar to that of quantum secret direct communication.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most
promising applications of quantum information science.
The goal of QKD is to allow two legitimate parties, Alice
and Bob, to generate a secret key over a long distance, in
the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve, who interferes with
the signals. QKD has progressed quickly since Benneett
and Brassard designed the original QKD protocol[1]. Re-
cently, a novel concept, quantum secure direct communi-
cation (QSDC) has been proposed and pursued[2, 3, 4].
Different from QKD, QSDC’s object is to transmit the
secret messages directly without first establishing a key
to encrypt them. QSDC can be used in some special en-
vironments which has been shown by Bostro¨em and Deng
et al.[3, 4].
Quantum secret sharing (QSS)[5, 6] is another impor-
tant application of quantum mechanics. The basic idea
of secret sharing in the simplest case is that the sender
Alice splits the secret message into two shares and dis-
tributes them to two receivers Bob and Charlie sepa-
rately, such that only the two receivers collaborate can
they reconstruct the secret message. In a more general
setting, a (m,n) threshold scheme, the secret message
is split into n shares, such that any m of those shares
can be used to reconstruct it. QSS is the generalization
of classical secret sharing and can share both classical
and quantum messages. QSS is likely to play a key role
in protecting secret quantum information, e.g., in secure
operations of distributed quantum computation, sharing
difficult-to-construct ancillary states and joint sharing of
quantum money, etc. Many researches have been carried
out in both theoretical and experimental aspects after
the pioneering QSS scheme proposed by Hillery, Buzeˇk
and Berthiaume in 1999 (hereafter called HBB99)[5].
∗Electronic address: jwang@nudt.edu.cn
The HBB99 scheme is based on a three-particle entan-
gled Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state. Karls-
son, Koashi and Imoto[6] proposed a QSS scheme us-
ing two-particle Bell states. Guo-Ping Guo and Guang-
Can Guo[7] presented a QSS scheme where only prod-
uct states are employed. Zhan-jun Zhang, Yong Li and
Zhong-xiao Man[8] proposed a QSS scheme using single
photons.
The efficiency is one of the important parameters of
quantum protocol. In the HBB99 scheme, only half of the
GHZ states can be used to generate shared secret mes-
sages, because the communication parties, Alice, Bob,
and Charlie need to choose randomly one measuring ba-
sis from either the X-basis or the Y -basis, respectively.
Recently, Li Xiao, Gui Lu Long, Fu Guo Deng, and
Jian Wei Pan[9] generalized the HBB99 scheme into ar-
bitrary multiparties and improved the efficiency of the
QSS scheme by two techniques from quantum key dis-
tribution (hereafter called XLDP04). One of the two
techniques is that all the participants choose their mea-
suring basis asymmetrically[10], another one is that all
the participants choose their measuring basis according
to a control key[11]. However, the flaws of the above two
techniques are obvious. The scheme using the first tech-
nique needs a refined data analysis and the scheme using
the other one requires the communication parties share
a common key.
In this paper, we present an efficient multiparty QSS
scheme using GHZ state and its transformation. It has
the high intrinsic efficiency as all the states are used
for secret sharing except that chosen for eavesdropping
check. It is not necessarily for the communication par-
ties to chose measuring basis for the measuring basis is
invariable in our scheme. In the eavesdropping check of
the scheme, the communication parties need only to an-
nounce their results of measurements. Our scheme pro-
vides higher efficiency than that of the XLDP04 scheme,
for the intrinsic shortage of their scheme. Moreover, the
sender, Alice can transmit her secret messages directly to
2the receivers, which is similar to QSDC. The receivers can
only recover the secure direct transmitted messages by
combining their results, after Alice announces her results.
Therefore the present scheme may also be called multi-
party quantum secure direct communication scheme.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec.II, we de-
scribe the three-party QSS scheme. In Sec.III, we dis-
cuss the security of the present scheme. In Sec.IV, we
generalize the three-party QSS scheme to (n, n) thresh-
old scheme. Finally, we give a summary in Sec.V.
II. THREE-PARTY QSS SCHEME
In the three-party QSS scheme, we suppose the sender
Alice wants to send a secret message to two receivers,
say Bob and charlie, so that none of the receivers can
recover the messages on his own. The basic idea of the
scheme originates from quantum teleportation[12]. Al-
ice entangles his encoded secret message state with a
prepared three-particle entangled state. She then per-
forms controlled-NOT (CNOT) operation and Hadamard
transformation, which is similar to the method used in
quantum teleportation. Different from quantum telepor-
tation, the receivers measure their particles in a fixed
measuring basis instead of performing unitary operation
to recover the sending qubit with Alice’s classical mes-
sage. The three-party QSS scheme is as follows:
(1) Alice prepares an ordered N three-particle states.
Each of three-particle states is randomly in the state
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)ABC , (1)
|ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(|0 + 0〉+ |1− 1〉)ABC , (2)
|ψ3〉 = 1√
2
(|00+〉+ |11−〉)ABC , (3)
|ψ4〉 = 1√
2
(|0 + +〉+ |1−−〉)ABC , (4)
where |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 −
|1〉). We denotes the ordered N three-particle qubits
with {[P1(A),P1(B),P1(C)], [P2(A),P2(B),P2(C)], · · · ,
[PN (A),PN (B),PN (C)]}, where the subscript indicates
the order of each three-particle in the sequence, and A,
B, C represents the three particles of each state, respec-
tively. Alice takes one particle from each state to form
an ordered partner particle sequence [P1(A), P2(A),· · · ,
PN(A)], called A sequence. The remaining partner parti-
cles composeB sequence, [P1(B), P2(B),· · · , PN(B)] and
C sequence, [P1(C), P2(C),· · · , PN(C)]. Alice sends B
sequence and C sequence to each Bob and Charlie. Bob
and Charlie then inform Alice that they have received N
particles, respectively.
(2) After hearing from Bob and Charlie, Alice an-
nounces publicly each of three-particle states she pre-
pared. If the state of [Pi(A),Pi(B),Pi(C)] is |ψ2〉 (|ψ3〉),
Bob (Charlie) performs Hadamard transformation
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
(5)
on Pi(B). If the state of [Pi(A),Pi(B),Pi(C)] is |ψ4〉,
Bob and Charlie perform Hadamard transformation on
Pi(B), Pi(C), respectively. The Hadamard transforma-
tion is crucial for the security of the scheme as we will
see in the sequel. After Bob and Charlie have done
Hadamard transformation, they inform Alice. Alice then
selects randomly a sufficiently large subset of particles
from A sequence, which we call D sequence. Alice gener-
ates a random bit string and encodes it on D sequence. If
Alice’s random bit is “0”(“1”), she prepares a particle a
in the state |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) (|−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)) for
each particle of D sequence. D sequence is used to check
eavesdropping, which we call checking sequence. The re-
maining particles of A sequence forms E sequence. E
sequence is used to encode Alice’s secret message, which
we call message encoding sequence. Alice then encodes
her secret message on E sequence. Similarly, if Alice’s se-
cret message is “0”(“1”), she prepares a particle a in the
state |+〉 (|−〉) for each particle of E sequence. Thus Al-
ice prepares N particles for each particle of A sequence,
which we call a sequence [P1(a), P2(a),· · · , PN (a)].
(3) If the state of the particle Pi(a) (i = 1, 2, · · · , N)
is |+〉, then the state of the particle Pi(a), Pi(A), Pi(B),
and Pi(C) is
|Φ0〉aABC =
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)a ⊗ 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)ABC .(6)
where the subscript a denotes the particle Pi(a). If the
state of the particle Pi(a) is |−〉, then the state of the
particle Pi(a), Pi(A), Pi(B), and Pi(C) is
|Φ1〉aABC =
1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)a ⊗ 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)ABC .(7)
(4) Alice sends the particle Pi(a), Pi(A) through a
CNOT gate (Pi(a) is the controller, Pi(A) is the target).
Then |Φ0〉aABC becomes
|Φ′0〉aABC =
1
2
(|0000〉+ |1100〉+ |0111〉+ |1011〉)aABC ,
(8)
and |Φ1〉aABC is changed to
|Φ′1〉aABC =
1
2
(|0000〉 − |1100〉+ |0111〉 − |1011〉)aABC .
(9)
(5) Alice performs Hadamard transformation on the
3particle Pi(a) and obtains
|Φ′′0 〉aABC =
1
2
[|00〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)BC
+|10〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)BC
+|01〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)BC
+|11〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|11〉 − |00〉)BC ]. (10)
or
|Φ′′1 〉aABC =
1
2
[|00〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)BC
+|10〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)BC
+|01〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|11〉 − |00〉)BC
+|11〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)BC ]. (11)
Noting that
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)BC = 1√
2
(|++〉+ | − −〉)BC , (12)
1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)BC = 1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉)BC , (13)
we can also write
|Φ′′0 〉aABC =
1
2
[|00〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|++〉+ | − −〉)BC
+|10〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉)BC
+|01〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|++〉+ | − −〉)BC
−|11〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉)BC ],
(14)
|Φ′′1 〉aABC =
1
2
[|00〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉)BC
+|10〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|++〉+ |++〉)BC
−|01〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉)BC
+|11〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|++〉+ | − −〉)BC ].
(15)
(6) Alice then measures the particle Pi(a), Pi(A) in the
Z-basis, {|0〉, |1〉}. Bob and Charlie measure the parti-
cle Pi(B), Pi(C) in the X-basis, {|+〉, |−〉}, respectively.
At this step, although Bob and Charlie obtain their re-
sults of measurements, they cannot recover Alice’s secret
message even if they collaborate, because they have no
information of Alice’s result. We can draw the above
conclusion according to the equation 14 and 15.
(7) Alice tells Bob and Charlie the order of D sequence
(checking sequence). She randomly selects half of parti-
cles of D sequence. She lets Bob announce his results
of measurements of the corresponding particles of B se-
quence firstly and then lets Charlie announce his results
of measurements of the corresponding particles of C se-
quence. For the other half of particles of D sequence she
lets Charlie firstly announce his results of measurements
and then does Bob. Alice judges whether her random
bits can be reconstructed correctly by combining Bob’s
and Charlie’s results. If the error rate is small, Alice can
conclude that there is no eavesdroppers in the line. Al-
ice, Bob and Charlie continue to perform the next step,
otherwise they abort the communication.
(8) If Alice is certain that there is no eavesdropping,
she announces the results of measurements of E sequence
(message encoding sequence). Thus Bob and Charlie can
collaborate to recover Alice’s secret message, according
to Alice’s results, as illustrated in Table 1.
TABLE I: The recovery of Alice’s secret message
Alice’s result Bob’s result Charlie’s result secret message
0 |+〉 |+〉 0
0 |+〉 |−〉 1
0 |−〉 |+〉 1
0 |−〉 |−〉 0
1 |+〉 |+〉 1
1 |+〉 |−〉 0
1 |−〉 |+〉 0
1 |−〉 |−〉 1
Suppose the results of Bob and Charlie are both |+〉.
If Alice’s result of measurement of particle a is “0” (“1”),
they then conclude that the Alice’s secret message is “0”
(“1”).
III. SECURITY OF THE THREE-PARTY QSS
SCHEME
So far we have proposed the three-party QSS scheme.
We now discuss the security of the present scheme. The
crucial point is that the randomly prepared four states
|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, |ψ3〉 and |ψ4〉 do not allow an eavesdropper
to have a successful attack and the eavesdropper’s attack
will be detected during the eavesdropping check.
We first consider the intercept-resend attack strategy.
Suppose that Bob is dishonest and he has managed to
get a hold of Charlie’s particle as well as his own. We
call the dishonest Bob, Bob*. Bob* can only intercept
C sequence at the step 1 of the scheme and he cannot
4make certain to which state does each of the intercepted
particles belong. |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, |ψ3〉 and |ψ4〉 can also be
expressed as
|ψ1〉 = 1
2
[|+〉
A
(|00〉+ |11〉)BC
+|−〉
A
(|00〉 − |11〉)BC ], (16)
|ψ2〉 = 1
2
√
2
{[|+〉
A
[(|00〉 − |11〉) + (|01〉+ |10〉)]BC
+|−〉
A
[(|00〉+ |11〉) + (|10〉 − |01〉)]BC}, (17)
|ψ3〉 = 1
2
√
2
{[|+〉
A
[(|00〉 − |11〉) + (|01〉+ |10〉)]BC
+|−〉
A
[(|00〉+ |11〉) + (|01〉 − |10〉)]BC}, (18)
|ψ4〉 = 1
2
[|+〉
A
(|00〉+ |11〉)BC
+|−〉
A
(|01〉+ |10〉)BC ]. (19)
Bob* measures Pi(B), Pi(C) in the Bell basis and
then resends Pi(C) to Charlie. Suppose Bob* obtains
1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉) after his Bell basis measurement. If
the original state of [Pi(A), Pi(B), Pi(C)] is |ψ2〉, then
the state collapses to |−〉
A
(|00〉 + |11〉). According to
the scheme, the state of [Pi(a), Pi(A), Pi(B), Pi(C)] is
changed to |1−〉
aA
(|+ 0〉+ | − 1〉)BC or |0−〉aA(|+ 0〉+
| − 1〉)BC at the step 6 of the scheme. Without Alice’s
result, Bob* cannot have any information about Alice’s
secret message. Moreover, Bob*’s eavesdropping will be
detected during the eavesdropping check. Because Char-
lie measures his particle in the X basis, Alice will find
half of her secret messages reconstructed by the results
of Bob* and Charlie are inconsistent with those of her.
The error rate introduced by Bob* will achieve 50%.
If the original state of [Pi(A), Pi(B), Pi(C)] is |ψ3〉,
Bob*’s eavesdropping will also introduce the error rate
of 50%. Similarly, suppose Bob* obtains 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)
after his Bell basis measurement. If the original state
of [Pi(A), Pi(B), Pi(C)] is |ψ2〉, then the state collapses
to |+〉
A
(|00〉 − |11〉). According to the scheme, the state
of [Pi(a), Pi(A), Pi(B), Pi(C)] becomes |0+〉aA(|+ 0〉 −
| − 1〉)BC or |1+〉aA(|+ 0〉+| − 1〉)BC at the step 6 of the
scheme. During the eavesdropping check, Bob*’s eaves-
dropping will be detected with probability 50%. If the
original state of [Pi(A), Pi(B), Pi(C)] is |ψ3〉, we can
draw the same conclusion. Similarly, if Bob* obtains
1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) or 1√
2
(|01〉− |10〉), his eavesdropping will
also be detected during the eavesdropping check.
We then consider the collective attack strategy. If
Bob* intercepts Charlie’s particle C and uses it and his
own ancillary particle B′ in the state |0〉 to do a CNOT
operation (the particle C is the controller, Bob*’s ancil-
lary particle, B′ is the target). After that, Bob* resends
the particle C to Charlie. Bob* cannot make certain to
which state does the intercepted particle belong since Al-
ice prepared the three-particle states in |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, |ψ3〉
or |ψ4〉 randomly. Bob* can performs CNOT operation
or Hadamard plus CNOT operation in this attack strat-
egy. Suppose the original state of [Pi(A), Pi(B), Pi(C)]
is |ψ1〉 or |ψ2〉 and Bob* performs CNOT operation on
the intercepted particle and his ancillary particle. At the
step 5 of the scheme, the state of [Pi(a), Pi(A), Pi(B),
Pi(B
′), Pi(C)] will be
1
2
[|00〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)BB′C
+|10〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉)BB′C
+|01〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)BB′C
+|11〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|111〉 − |000〉)BB′C ]. (20)
or
1
2
[|00〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉)BB′C
+|10〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)BB′C
+|01〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|111〉 − |000〉)BB′C
+|11〉
aA
⊗ 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)BB′C ], (21)
where the subscripts B and B′ represent Bob*’s particle
sent by Alice and his ancillary particle, respectively. Note
that
1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)BB′C = 1
2
[(|00〉+ |11〉)BB′ ⊗ |+〉C
+(|00〉 − |11〉)BB′ ⊗ |−〉C ]
(22)
and
1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉)BB′C = 1
2
[(|00〉 − |11〉)BB′ ⊗ |+〉C
+(|00〉+ |11〉)BB′ ⊗ |−〉C ].
(23)
Bob* measures the particle B,B′, but he can only obtain
1√
2
(|00〉+|11〉)BB′ or 1√
2
(|00〉−|11〉)BB′ , each with proba-
bility 1/2. Without Charlie’s result, Bob* cannot obtain
any information about Alice’s secret message. During
the eavesdropping check, Bob*’s eavesdropping will be
detected since Alice randomly let Bob or Charlie firstly
announce their results of measurements. Suppose the
original state of [Pi(A), Pi(B), Pi(C)] is |ψ3〉 or |ψ4〉 and
Bob* performs Hadamard plus CNOT operation on the
intercepted particle and his ancillary particle. Similarly,
at the step 5 of the scheme, the state of [Pi(a), Pi(A),
5Pi(B), Pi(B
′), Pi(C)] can also be expressed as the equa-
tion 20 or 21. Thus Bob* cannot also obtain any informa-
tion about Alice’s secret message without Charlie’s result
and his eavesdropping will be detected by Alice easily.
IV. MULTIPARTY QSS SCHEME
We can easily generalize the three-party QSS scheme
to a n-party(n > 3) QSS one. Suppose that Alice want
to send her secret message to n− 1 users. Alice prepare
an ordered N n-particle states. Each of n-particle states
is randomly in the state
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(
n∏
i=1
|0〉
ai
+
n∏
i=1
|1〉
ai
), (24)
|Ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(|0+〉
a1a2
n∏
i=3
|0〉
ai
+ |1−〉a1a2
n∏
i=3
|1〉
ai
), (25)
...
|Ψn〉 = 1√
2
(
n−1∏
i=1
|0〉
ai
|+〉
an
+
n−1∏
i=1
|1〉
ai
|−〉
an
), (26)
|Ψn+1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉
a1
n∏
i=2
|+〉
ai
+ |1〉a1
n∏
i=2
|−〉
ai
), (27)
where a1 denotes the sender, Alice’s particle and ai de-
notes the i-th user’s particle (i = 1, 2, · · · , n). The fol-
lowing steps of the multiparty scheme is similar to those
of the three-party scheme. After transmitting the par-
ticles to n − 1 users, Alice announces publicly each of
n-particle states she prepared. The user, ai performs
Hadamard transformation on his corresponding particle
according to Alice’s information. Alice selects randomly
a sufficiently large subset of particles from her particle
sequence, which is formed checking sequence. Alice gen-
erates a random bit string and encodes it on the check-
ing sequence. The remaining particles of Alice particle
sequence forms message encoding sequence, on which Al-
ice encodes her secret message. Alice’s random bit string
and secret message forms a N -bit string. Alice prepares a
particle, a in the state |+〉 or |−〉 according to the value
of each bit of the N -bit string. She then performs a
CNOT operation on her own particles a and a1, where a
is the controller, a1 is the target. The state of the system
becomes
1√
2
(|00〉
aa1
⊗
n∏
i=2
|0〉
ai
+ |11〉
aa1
⊗
n∏
i=2
|0〉
ai
+|01〉
aa1
⊗
n∏
i=2
|1〉
ai
+ |10〉
aa1
⊗
n∏
i=2
|1〉
ai
) (28)
or
1√
2
(|00〉
aa1
⊗
n∏
i=2
|0〉
ai
− |11〉
aa1
⊗
n∏
i=2
|0〉
ai
+|01〉
aa1
⊗
n∏
i=2
|1〉
ai
− |10〉
aa1
⊗
n∏
i=2
|1〉
ai
). (29)
Alice performs Hadamard transformation on the particle
a, obtaining
1√
2
[|0+〉
aa1
⊗ 1√
2
(
n∏
i=2
|0〉
ai
+
n∏
i=2
|1〉
ai
)
+|1−〉
aa1
⊗ 1√
2
(
n∏
i=2
|0〉
ai
−
n∏
i=2
|1〉
ai
) (30)
or
1√
2
[|0−〉
aa1
⊗ 1√
2
(
n∏
i=2
|0〉
ai
−
n∏
i=2
|1〉
ai
)
+|1+〉
aa1
⊗ 1√
2
(
n∏
i=2
|0〉
ai
+
n∏
i=2
|1〉
ai
) (31)
Noting that
|Ω0〉 = 1√
2
(
n∏
i=2
|0〉
ai
+
n∏
i=2
|1〉
ai
)
=
1
2
[(
n−1∏
i=2
|0〉
ai
+
n−1∏
i=2
|1〉
ai
)⊗ |+〉
an
+(
n−1∏
i=2
|0〉
ai
−
n−1∏
i=2
|1〉
ai
)⊗ |−〉
an
(32)
and
|Ω1〉 = 1√
2
(
n∏
i=2
|0〉
ai
−
n∏
i=2
|1〉
ai
)
=
1
2
[(
n−1∏
i=2
|0〉
ai
−
n−1∏
i=2
|1〉
ai
)⊗ |+〉
an
+(
n−1∏
i=2
|0〉
ai
+
n−1∏
i=2
|1〉
ai
)⊗ |−〉
an
, (33)
we can rewritten |Ω0〉, |Ω1〉 in the X-basis by iterating
the equation 32, 33. We then obtain
|Ω0〉 = 1
2n−3
√
2
[
n∏
i=2
|+〉
ai
+(
n−3∏
i=2
|+〉
ai
)⊗ | − −〉
an−1an
+ · · · ]. (34)
The right of the equation 34 is the sum of 2n−2 terms,
each term is the permutation and combination of |+〉, |−〉
6and the number of |−〉 in each term is even. we can also
obtain
|Ω1〉 = 1
2n−3
√
2
[(
n−1∏
i=2
|+〉
ai
)⊗ |−〉
an
+(
n−3∏
i=2
|+〉
ai
)⊗ | −+〉
an−1an
+ · · · ]. (35)
The right of the equation 35 is also the sum of 2n−2
terms, each term is the permutation and combination of
|+〉, |−〉, but the number of |−〉 in each term is odd. For
example
1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉) = 1
2
(|+++〉+ |+ −−〉
+| − −+〉+ | −+−〉), (36)
1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉)BC = 1
2
(|++−〉+ |+−+〉
+| −++〉+ | − −−〉). (37)
Alice then measures the particle a, a1 in the Z-basis
and the receivers, n − 1 users measure the particle
a2, · · · , an in theX-basis, respectively. After doing these,
Alice tells the users the order of checking sequence and
randomly lets them announce firstly their results of mea-
surements. Alice decides whether her random bit string
can be recovered correctly by collaborating the n − 1
user’s results. If the error rate is small, Alice can con-
clude that there is no eavesdroppers in the line. She
then announces the results of measurements of message
encoding sequence. Thus the n− 1 users can collaborate
to recover Alice’s message. The security analysis of the
multiparty QSS scheme is similar to that of the three-
party case, as described in Sec.III.
V. SUMMARY
So far we have proposed an (n, n) threshold QSS
scheme of secure direct communication. Alice encodes
her secret message into a given state and sends it to the
receivers directly using quantum channel. Without Al-
ice’s result of measurement, the receivers cannot have any
information about Alice’s secret message even if they col-
laborate. Alice announces her result only if she is certain
that there is no eavesdropping in the line and only in such
a way can the receivers collaborate to recover Alice’s se-
cret message. By this token, the present scheme is similar
to QSDC protocol, different from the QSS scheme whose
task is essentially to allow a sender to establish a shared
key with the receivers. In our scheme, the states that
Alice prepared randomly are important that the eaves-
dropping of the dishonest party or the eavesdropper, Eve
can be detected easily. The present scheme is efficient in
that all the GHZ states used in the scheme are used to
generate shared secret messages except those chosen for
checking eavesdropper, the classical messages exchanged
between the communication parties only include the re-
sults of the measurements, and the process of the scheme
is also simple.
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